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Abstract
Critical infrastructure systems must be both robust and resilient in order to ensure the functioning of
society. To improve the performance of such systems, we often use risk and vulnerability analysis to find and
address system weaknesses. A critical component of such analyses is the ability to accurately determine the
negative consequences of various types of failures in the system. Numerous mathematical and simulation models
exist which can be used to this end. However, there are relatively few studies comparing the implications of
using different modeling approaches in the context of comprehensive risk analysis of critical infrastructures.
Thus in this paper, we suggest a classification of these models, which span from simple topologically-oriented
models to advanced physical flow-based models. Here, we focus on electric power systems and present a study
aimed at understanding the tradeoffs between simplicity and fidelity in models used in the context of risk
analysis. Specifically, the purpose of this paper is to compare performances measures achieved with a spectrum
of approaches typically used for risk and vulnerability analysis of electric power systems and evaluate if
more simplified topological measures can be combined using statistical methods to be used as a surrogate
for physical flow models. The results of our work provide guidance as to appropriate models or combination
of models to use when analyzing large-scale critical infrastructure systems, where simulation times quickly
become insurmountable when using more advanced models, severely limiting the extent of analyses that can
be performed.
KEY WORDS: critical infrastructure, electric power, functional models, topological models, load flow
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1. INTRODUCTION
Critical infrastructure systems form the foundation for the economic prosperity, security,
and public health of the modern world (1). As such, failures within these complex systems
can pose a significant threat to society. Unfortunately, failures in infrastructure systems occur
relatively frequently, arising from a variety of sources including natural disasters, terrorism,
and accidents. Such failures, which may at first seem isolated or insignificant, have the po-
tential for far-reaching and devastating consequences. Thus, understanding the reliability and
vulnerability of such systems has become an increasingly significant concern of decision-makers
in both the public and private realms. Understanding system vulnerabilities and reliability is of
particular concern as utilities have become increasingly interested in proactive risk management
after recent events such as Hurricanes Irene and Sandy in the U.S. and major winter storms
that have had significant impacts on power systems.
A crucial factor in conducting useful reliability and vulnerability analyses is the ability
to accurately characterize the consequences of failures within the system. Understanding a
system’s robustness - that is, the degree of sensitivity of system performance to failures -
allows us to identify and address critical weaknesses in the system. This understanding is
generally gained through the use of a system performance model, and the fidelity of these
models vary significantly. For example, for electric power infrastructure, performance models
vary from purely topological-based models that do not incorporate the engineering or physical
aspects of the system performance to complex AC power flow models based on the physical
and engineering details of the system. If we use models which incorrectly predict system
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performance, our assessments are likely to give rise to sub-optimal management decisions for
the infrastructure system in question. Unfortunately, the accuracy of such models is often taken
for granted when assessing the robustness (i.e., the opposite of vulnerabilty) of infrastructure
systems. Thus, in this work, our goal is to understand the implications of using models of
varying complexity for evaluating infrastructure system performance. To limit the scope of our
work, we will focus specifically on electric power systems.
The following approach is commonly used for assessing the robustness of infrastructure sys-
tems: 1) modeling the initial performance of the infrastructure system of interest; 2) simulating
various types of failures in these systems; and 3) evaluating the consequences of the failures
by use of some measure of system performance (2,3,4,5,6,7). However, for a given infrastructure
system, there are numerous mathematical and simulation models which can be used to this end;
in this paper, we refer to such models as functional models (8). Additionally, system robustness
can be quantified by a variety of performance measures.
Functional models currently in use for electric power system analysis range in complexity
from pure topological approaches to physics-based models of AC power flows. Strict topological
models only use information about the network structure (i.e., nodes and edges) to describe
the behavior of the system, ignoring physical constraints such as the physics governing power
flow. This means that some important factors affecting system performance are neglected (9);
in return, the models are computationally efficient, meaning that it is possible to analyze large
systems and a large number of contingencies within feasible computational times. Another
benefit is that very little information about the system is needed to perform risk and vul-
nerability studies. Additionally, topological models require significantly less data about the
system than physics-based models. Such physics-based models, often used by power engineers,
incorporate capacity limits of system components as well as the physics governing power
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flow (i.e., Kirchoff’s laws). These models will provide the most accurate representation of
a power system, however, their computational complexity often makes their use impractical,
particularly when modeling large systems and analyzing many failure scenarios.
There has been little research aimed at systematically evaluating the impact of using differ-
ent functional models for assessing electric power system robustness. Hines et al. (author?) (10)
compare different models for evaluating electric power systems. They conclude that topological
models may lead to misleading results as compared to performance estimates from a DC-
linearized load flow model. However, they did not compare their results to those of a full AC
power flow model and they only considered two topological performance measures. Overbye
et al. (author?) (11) compare the use of DC-linearized and AC power flow models for setting
Locational Marginal Prices (LMP), concluding that the two models produce satisfactorily
similar results. However, it is difficult to generalize their findings to the present context since
the study was not conducted with regard to analyzing robustness. In addition, they did not
look into simpler topological models, and they only addressed failures scenarios involving a
single system component which are not likely to provide a full picture of system robustness.
Finally, Chen et al. (author?) (12) suggest a hybrid approach for modeling cascading failures
that includes a DC-linearized power flow model. However, they only provide a comparison
to a single topological performance measure (efficiency) and the comparison made is not as
systematic as is necessary to enable a clear conclusion to be drawn.
In this paper, we present a study that aims to improve our understanding of the tradeoffs
between simplicity and fidelity of these models in the context of assessing infrastructure system
robustness. More specifically, the goal of the paper is to compare different functional models
used to estimate the performance of electric power systems in order to evaluate how well
simplified functional models are able to capture the behavior of the systems when exposed to
6 LaRocca, Johansson, Hassel, and Guikema
perturbations. Finally, we aim to develop a method which combines the strengths of existing
approaches to yield a model that accurately reflects system behavior while still maintaining
computational feasibility.
2. CLASSIFICATION OF FUNCTIONAL MODELS
As mentioned in the introduction, the functional models used in existing studies of in-
frastructure robustness span from very simple to very advanced. In this section we propose
a general classification of such approaches, consisting of four classes of increasingly advanced
functional models: topological models with undifferentiated components; topological models
with differentiated components; simplistic capacity models; and physical flow models. We
describe each of these classes in the following subsections, focusing on approaches used to assess
electric power system robustness. It should be noted, however, that a similar classification can
be used for other types of technical infrastructure models.
2.1 Topological models, undifferentiated components
Many existing studies of infrastructure robustness employ topological functional models
based on network theory. Such models are a particularly valuable tool for assessing infrastruc-
ture robustness, because most infrastructure systems naturally take the form of a network.
Topological models disregard physical flows in the system, instead representing the system
abstractly as a collection of nodes and edges. In the simplest category of topological models,
there is no differentiation between components in the system; that is, different functions within
the set of nodes or edges are ignored (13,3,14,6,15,16). When modeling power systems, this means
that no distinction is made between buses, substations, or generators - all are treated simply
as nodes (overhead power lines and underground cables are treated simply as edges).
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2.2 Topological models, differentiated components
Neglecting to differentiate between types of system components may provide an inaccurate
representation of reality, particularly if the components are actually highly heterogeneous
(e.g., have significantly different functions). Therefore, a second, more complex, category of
topological models is often used, incorporating details about the various functions of the system
components. For power systems, a commonly used approach is to model the system as a network
consisting of three types of nodes: generators, stations, and load points; another approach is
to simply differentiate between in-feed and load nodes (17,6,18,16).
2.3 Simplistic capacity models
Simplistic capacity models are a class of functional models which use network flow methods
combined with actual system data to represent loads and capacities in the system. Because
such methods do not attempt to incorporate physical flow modeling (e.g., hydraulic modeling
or power flow analysis), but instead rely on a network-based approach, these models should
still be seen as predominantly topological. Several simplistic capacity models have been used
for analyzing power system robustness. Wang et al. (author?) (19) develop a functional model
which incorporates information about maximum load and generator capacity in the system
along with line impedances with a traditional topological approach, resulting in a concept
they call ‘electrical betweenness.’ Another approach, presented in Jo¨nsson et al. (author?) (20)
uses capacity values for all in-feed nodes (i.e., generators), as well as demand at load nodes
(i.e., distribution substations) to calculate the amount of power not supplied to substations.
This functional model relies a network search algorithm to ‘push’ capacity of an in-feed node
through the network to load nodes, rather than conducting a complete load flow analysis in
accordance with Kirchoff’s laws.
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2.4 Physical flow models
The topological approaches described above may not fully capture the details regarding the
physical flow in the systems under study. However, the fundamental physical laws governing
the flows in different types of infrastructure are typically well-known, and are therefore easy to
include in a functional model, at least conceptually. Modeling such physical flows does come at
a cost, though; both computational times and initial data requirements are likely to increase
when using such a functional model. For electric power systems, physical flows are typically
addressed by the use of a DC-linearized or AC load flow model to evaluate the steady-state
conditions of the system. Several previous studies have, to varying extent, incorporated DC or
AC load flow analysis in assessing infrastructure robustness and reliability (21,22,23,24,25,26,27,12).
2.5 Performance measures
For any given functional model, there may be multiple measures that can be used to quan-
tify system performance. For example, when using a topological model with undifferentiated
components (i.e. representing the system as a network with no additional information except
the relationships between nodes and edges), a variety of network theoretic measures can be
selected to describe system performance, including size of the largest connected subgraph,
average path length, and network diameter. Or, when using a physical flow model, such as DC
load flow for an electric power system, performance could be quantified as unsupplied load or
the number of customers without power. When comparing functional models, it is important
to also consider the corresponding performance measure being used. Thus, in this work, we
evaluate functional model-performance measure pairs.
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3. METHODS
3.1 Test system
In this work, we use the one-area IEEE Reliability Test System-1996 (RTS96), a bulk power
transmission system (230 and 138 kV) including generation, transmission, and loads (28). As a
test system designed specifically for reliability studies, the description of RTS96 includes de-
tailed data on generation reliability and capacity, transmission system reliability and capacity,
and load curves with respect to both yearly and daily variation (28). The system consists of
24 buses (nodes) and 38 branches (edges). The annualized peak power demand is 2850 MW
in total; annual and daily fluctuations of loads are not taken into account here. Aggregated
generation capacity is 3405 MW. We use the 24-hour emergency power rating of lines for line
capacity.
3.2 Functional models and performance measures
As discussed previously, there are a number of functional models and performance measures
which can be used to analyze the robustness of infrastructure systems. In this work, we test 9
different functional model-performance measure pairs using the IEEE RTS-96 system described
above, as summarized in Table I . Although many of these functional models and performance
measures are flexible enough to incorporating the potential for cascading failures, here we focus
only on ‘static’ versions of these models. The following sections describe in detail the functional
models and corresponding performance measures used in our analysis.
[Table 1 about here.]
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3.2.1 Topological models, undifferentiated components
In existing studies of electric power system robustness using a topological model with
undifferentiated components, a variety of network theory-based performance measures have
been suggested (17,6,15,29,27,16,30). Here, we evaluate three of these performance measures: largest
connected subgraph; network diameter; and network efficiency. These performance measures,
as used in conjunction with a topological function model with undifferentiated components,
are described below.
Largest connected subgraph (LCSG). The largest connected subgraph in a graph is
defined as the largest subgraph in which a path exists between all pairs of nodes. Then, the
size of the largest connected subgraph is defined as:
SLCSG = NLCSG, (1)
where NLCSG is the number of nodes in the largest subgraph.
Diameter (D). The diameter of a network is defined as the ‘longest shortest path’ in
the network, that is:
D = maxi,jdij, (2)
where dij is the length of the shortest path (i.e., number of edges) between node i and node j.
Efficiency (E). Network efficiency, also known as average inverse path length, is defined
as follows:
E =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
i,j
1
dij
, (3)
where N is the number of nodes in the network and dij is the length of the shortest path
between node i and node j.
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3.2.2 Topological models, differentiated components
As previously mentioned, not differentiating between different types of system components
may result in a misrepresentation of true system behavior. In order to overcome this limitation,
several topologically-based performance measures have been used in existing studies to account
for the fact that all nodes and edges do not have the same function (17,31). Additionally, we
propose two new topological measures that we hypothesize might more accurately capture the
performance of electric power systems. These performance measures, both existing and newly
proposed, are described below.
Efficiency, pairs of in-feed and load nodes (EN). As described above, network
efficiency is calculated based on the shortest paths between all pairs of nodes in the network.
However, in an electric power system it may not be particularly relevant whether pairs of load-
nodes are well connected unless they are also well-connected to those nodes that inject the
electric flow into the system (e.g. generators and transformers). Thus, our first newly proposed
measure of network efficiency is calculated as with the traditional measure of network efficiency,
E, described above, with the exception that only paths between in-feed and load nodes are
considered. That is,
EN =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
i∈NF ,j∈NL
1
dij
, (4)
where N is the total number of nodes in the network, NF is the set of in-feed nodes, NL is the
set of load nodes, and dij is the length of the shortest path between node i and node j.
Efficiency, pairs of in-feed and load nodes, weighted by impedance (ENE).
Here, we suggest a second new measure incorporating ‘electrical distance,’ that is, line impedance,
into the shortest path calculations. Our second measure of network efficiency is calculated as
EN , with the addition that path length is weighted by electrical line impedance. So, we have:
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ENE =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
i∈NF ,j∈NL
1
dij|Zij| , (5)
where N is the total number of nodes in the network, NF is the set of in-feed nodes, NL is the
set of load nodes, dij is the length of the shortest path between node i and node j, and |Zij|
is the magnitude of the impedance of path ij.
Connectivity loss (CL). Connectivity loss is a topologically-based performance mea-
sure for electric power systems that was first proposed in Albert et al. (author?) (17). It
describes the ‘ability of distribution substations to receive power from the generators,’ and is
defined as follows:
CL = 1− 1
ND
ND∑
i
N iG
NG
, (6)
where NG is the total number of generators, ND is the total number of distribution substations,
and N iG is the number of generators connected to substation i.
Power connection loss (PCL). Power connection loss was first described by Johansson
et al. (author?) (31) as the aggregate load at nodes that do not have any connection to an
in-feed node, such as a generator or transformer. It is thus defined as:
PCL =
∑
i∈NC
loadi, (7)
where NC is the set of nodes that do not have any connection to an in-feed node and loadi is
the load at node i.
3.2.3 Simplistic capacity models
We evaluate a simplistic capacity model for electric power systems that was first presented
in Jo¨nsson et al. (author?) (20). This network flows-based algorithm, which is used to calculate
total amount of real power not supplied to substations without incorporating Kirchoff’s laws,
is described below.
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Power not supplied (PNS). This method requires capacity values for all in-feed nodes
(i.e., generators), as well as demand at load nodes (i.e., distribution substations). Power not
supplied is calculated as follows: 1) select initial in-feed node; 2) push capacity of in-feed node
through network using a breadth-first search; 3) subtract substation loads from initial capacity
of in-feed node when a substation is reached and flag substation as supplied; 4) continue
distributing capacity of initial in-feed node until it has been consumed; 5) select another in-
feed node; 6) return to step 1, repeating until all connected substations are supplied or all
available in-feed capacity is consumed; 7) power not supplied is equal to the total substation
load that is not supplied. Thus, we have:
PNS =
n∑
i
loaddemandedi − loadsuppliedi , (8)
where n is the number of nodes in the network, loaddemandedi is the demand at node i and
loadsuppliedi is the load supplied to node i.
3.2.4 Physical flow models
For electric power systems, physical flow-based functional models involve load flow analysis
to evaluate the steady-state conditions of the system, either using a DC-linearized approxi-
mation or a full AC power flow model. The most accurate way to represent the physical flow
of power in an electric power system is to use an AC load flow model. However, AC power
flow is described by nonlinear equations for which convergent solutions are often difficult to
obtain; solving AC power flow requires significant computational resources and time which
are often prohibitive, particularly in large-scale simulations. As a result, a DC-linearized
approximation, which only considers the flow of real power, ignoring reactive power, is often
used to approximate AC power flow. The relative simplicity of the DC equations combined
with their linearity allows a direct (i.e. non-iterative) solution to be obtained quickly.
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Power not supplied, based on DC load flow analysis (DC), and power not
supplied, based on AC load flow analysis (AC) . To perform both DC and AC load
flow modeling, we use a Matlab package called Matpower (32), which was developed through
the Power Systems Engineering Research Center (PSERC). Matpower allows for calculation of
DC linearized power flow, AC power flow, DC linearized optimal power flow (DC OPF), and
AC optimal power flow (AC OPF). Optimal power flow is determined through an objective
function which minimizes generation and unsupplied load costs and includes constraints such
as branch capacity and voltage limits. Here we use the optimal power flow algorithm for both
the AC and DC models, curtailing load until a solution can be attained. If a solution cannot be
found which satisfies the constraints, all load in the system or subsystem (if the initial system
has split into several subsystems) (33,34,35,36,37). We measure system performance as the total
amount of load (active power only) curtailed as a result of failures in the system.
The generation, loading, and branch-limits used were provided with the test system. The
settings for busbar voltage limits were 1.1 p.u. for the upper limit and 0.7 p.u. for the lower
limit. This relatively low value for the lower voltage limit was selected because in this work we
are calculating load flow for a severely strained system. However, a system operating at below
0.7 p.u. is likely to experience a voltage collapse, in accordance with Taylor (38). The loads
in the system were designated as negative generators and associated with a large negative
cost (piecewise linear cost function with the settings x0 = 0, y0 = 0, x1 = −Pload, and
y1 = −10000Pload). The generation cost was set with low positive values (polynomial cost
function with nominal values for c2 = 1, c1 = 1, and c0 = 0)
5.
5In the rare occasion of convergence problems with the optimization algorithm, different c2 values were selected in attempts to
find a converging solution, where c2 ∈ {0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 2, 4, 5, 18, 32, 64}
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3.3 Failure scenarios
Since our goal in this work is to evaluate the effectiveness of various functional models
in the context of assessing infrastructure system vulnerability, we develop a set of failure
scenarios, or strains, which our network experiences. Most topological studies of power system
vulnerability focus on node removals, so we assess node failures here. However, in real power
systems, overload-related failures are more likely to occur in lines than in buses, and thus it is
important to also address edge failures. We simulate each type of failure independently; that
is, in one set of scenarios we consider node failures and in another we consider edge failures.
In order to limit the scope of our work, we only evaluate scenarios in which system
components fail randomly. To generate a given random failure scenario, we use a uniform
random number generator to sequentially select nodes or edges for removal from operation,
resulting in a strain vector, or failure scenario vector, containing a random ordering of all
nodes or edges in the the system. We repeat this process 1,000 times for both nodes and edges,
resulting in two strain matrices (one for nodes and one for edges) consisting of 1,000 vectors of
randomly ordered component failures. We then use the strain matrices to simulate failures in
our test system and evaluate the subsequent system performance using the functional model-
performance measure pairs described above in Section 3.2.
3.4 Statistical analysis
Ideally, the reference for comparing the results from using different functional models and
performance measures should be empirical results from the system of interest. However, since
we are conducting our analysis on a fictitious test system, such data do not exist 6. Therefore, we
6Even when analyzing a real system, it is highly unlikely that one would be able to obtain empirical data for more than a few
failure scenarios.
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assume that the most advanced functional model (i.e., the full AC load flow model) corresponds
most closely with the true performance of the system. For the AC load flow functional model,
our performance measure is the load curtailed (real power) in the system as a fraction of
the initial load in the system, that is, the percent change in load that the system is able to
meet after a given failure scenario. Because different performance measures are used for other
functional models (e.g., network diameter for a pure topological approach) and do not directly
correspond to load curtailed, we standardize all other performance measures to the range [0,1]
in order to carry out our comparisons.
For each of the nine functional model-performance measure pairs described above, we fit
simple linear regression models with load curtailed as based on AC load flow analysis as the
response variable. Table II summarizes the models for each functional model-performance
measure. We also fit multiple linear regression models using six different combinations of
functional model-performance measure pairs as covariates. After fitting each of these initial
models, we iteratively remove all covariates from the model that are not statistically significant.
That is, for a given model, we remove the explanatory variable with the highest p-value, refit
the model, and repeat until all variables are statistically significant at the level of α = 0.05.
Table III presents each combination of covariates used to develop our multiple linear regression
models. As with the simple linear regression models (Table II ), we use six different sets of data
to fit six independent multiple linear regression models for each of the covariate combinations
in Table III .
[Table 2 about here.]
[Table 3 about here.]
We then test the predictive accuracy of each of the 90 resulting regression models using
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repeated random holdout validation. For each model, we randomly split our initial data into
two sets: training data (90% of initial data) and validation data (10% of initial data). We use
our training data to fit a regression model using the initial combination of parameters from
Tables II and III . We then use this new regression model to predict load curtailed for each
record in the validation data set. We compare these predicted values to the actual values from
our AC load flow analysis. For each of the 90 full regression models, we repeat this process
100 times (beginning with the random split of our initial data) for a 100-fold random holdout
cross-validation.
4. RESULTS
For each node failure scenario and edge failure scenario, we use our functional model-
performance measures to assess the behavior of the system after each level of component
removal (i.e., 1 component removed, 2 components removed, through n components removed,
where n is the number of nodes or edges in the system). Figures 1 and 2 present comparisons
of each functional model-performance measure with the results of the AC load flow analysis
for all failure scenarios and numbers of components removed. Based on these results, it is
clear that although a functional model-performance measure may give a reasonable estimate
of the average consequences that arise, the correctness of the estimate for the individual
scenarios may vary greatly. This is significant, because in reality systems are not typically
subjected repeatedly to varying failure scenarios. Instead, when assessing system robustness,
it is important to understand reasonably well how the system will perform when subjected to
a specific failure scenario, and unfortunately this information is not provided by all functional
model-performance measures.
[Figure 1 about here.]
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[Figure 2 about here.]
Figures 1 and 2 show that the accuracy of the performance measures largely follows
the classification in Section 2; that is, in general, the greater the inclusion of functional
characteristics, the better the estimate of the system’s actual performance for a given failure
scenario. The topological performance measures LCSG and D both significantly overestimate
and underestimate the consequences for individual failure scenarios, though the diameter
measure more often underestimates consequences. One reason that the largest connected
subgraph measure may overestimate consequences is that it is possible for the system to split
into two subgraphs, or islands, but still be able to supply all the load from the generators in
each island. In such a situation, the LCSG performance measure would estimate significantly
decreased performance, when in fact the system was still functioning at its initial performance.
The performance measures E, EN, ENE, and CL typically overestimate consequences as
compared to the AC model. The more physically oriented models, PCL, PNS and DC nearly
always underestimate the consequences for individual scenarios as compared to the AC model.
The reason for this is because they do not account for voltage and branch constraints (except for
the DC optimal power flow model, which does consider active power flow branch constraints).
The proposed performance measures EN and ENE do not capture the behavior of the system
better than the classic network theoretic measure of efficiency (E), which does not take any
physical aspects into account. The best performing functional model-performance measures
are clearly PCL, PNS and DC, but LCSG appears to also give a reasonable estimate of system
performance for node removals, but less so for edge removals.
The repeated random holdout validation tests conducted for each of our 90 regression
models (45 models for node failures and 45 models for edge failures) further support the
trends described above. That is, we see that when more physical information about the
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system that is included in a single or group of functional model-performance measure(s),
these functional model-performance measure(s) are, in general, better able to predict AC-load
curtailed. Figures 3 and 4 present the root mean squared errors averaged over 100 holdout
samples for each of the regression models; the error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
[Figure 3 about here.]
[Figure 4 about here.]
For node failure scenarios, we see that the three topological models with undifferentiated
components (D, E, and LCSG) result in the highest predictive errors. The topological models
with differentiated components (ENE, CL, and EN) provide slightly better estimates of AC-
load curtailed. The simplistic capacity models (PCL and PNS) and the physical flow model
(DC) have significantly lower predictive errors than either category of topological models. Of
particular interest here is the relatively high predictive accuracy of the simplistic capacity
model, Power Not Supplied (PNS). This functional model does not require complete modeling
of physical flows, yet it is still able to estimate the AC behavior of the system significantly
better than the simpler topological models. However, it is important to note that even the
most complicated functional model, the DC load flow model, has a non-zero predictive error
and is not able to completely capture the true behavior of the system.
Similar patterns appear when using multiple functional model-performance measures to
predict system behavior. Combinations of functional model-performance measures encompass-
ing less physical information about the system have lower predictive accuracy (i.e., higher
predictive error) than combinations that include more physical details. Several combinations of
functional model-performance measures are particularly interesting here. The LCSG/D/EN/CL
regression model uses only topologically-based functional models, so it is fairly simple both
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with respect to computation and data requirements. However, combining these functional
model-performance measures provides an increase in predictive accuracy over any of the single
functional model-performance measures; this increase becomes larger as the number of node
failures increases. The LCSG/D/EN/CL/PCL/PNS regression model combines topological
models with simplistic capacity models; this combination of functional models-performance
measures also increases the predictive accuracy of the regression model over any of the single
function model-performance measures. The increase is particularly significant when only one
node fails in a given scenario, bringing the predictive error of the model close to zero.
Results for the edge failure scenarios are similar to those for the node failure scenarios.
The topologically-based functional models again have high predictive error, but here there
is less distinction between the predictive accuracy of topological models with differentiated
and undifferentiated components. The simplistic capacity models (PCL and PNS) have lower
predictive error than the topological functional models, though PNS does not provide as large
an improvement over PCL for edge failures as it did for node failures. This difference may arise
in part because simplistic capacity models do not incorporate capacity constraints for power
lines; such constraints are likely to have a more significant effect on system behavior when it
is subjected to edge failures than when it experiences node failures as fewer lines are available
in the system to carry the power from generators to load. Finally, as with the node failure
scenarios, the DC load flow functional model results in significant predictive error.
Overall, when combining multiple functional model-performance measures to predict sys-
tem behavior for edge failures, we see larger improvements over single functional model-
performance measure predictions than we see with node failures. Here, all three combinations of
topological functional model-performance measures (LCSG/D/E; LCSG/D/EN; LCSG/D/EN/CL)
provide higher predictive accuracy for each level of edge removal than do any of the included
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single topological functional model-performance measures. Again, because these functional
model-performance measures are computationally simple, the benefits in increased predictive
accuracy gained by combining several functional model-performance measures do not come at
a high cost. Combining topological and simplistic capacity functional model-performance mea-
sures (CL/PCL/PNS; LCSG/D/EN/CL/PCL/PNS) also results in higher predictive accuracy
than any of the included functional model-performance measures individually.
5. DISCUSSION
The results here clearly depict that the greater the inclusion of physical characteristics
in the functional model, the better the estimate of the systems actual performance when
perturbed. Using more complicated performance measures does come at a cost, primarily in
computational time but also with regards to the information about the system that is required.
In our analysis, mean simulation times for a given node failure scenario ranged from 0.1 (0.1
for edges) seconds 7 for the simplest topological approaches to 1.2 (3.8) seconds for the DC
load flow model and 3.5 (10.8) seconds for the AC load flow model. At first glance, these
simulation times may all seem quite reasonable, but it is important to note that our test
system is much smaller than real-world systems, and differences in simulation times between
simple and advanced approaches will scale exponentially.
The results shown in this paper do not imply that the more simplistic performance measures
do not provide any useful information. As has been shown, several topologically-based perfor-
mance measures that also include some physical information (i.e., power connection loss (PCL)
and power not supplied (PNS)) provide similar results to the DC and AC load flow models
in some situations. These measures are likely to provide reasonable representations of reality
7Simulations were performed using a single core of an Intel Xeon 5160 quad core 3.00 GHz processor.
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in complex, large-scale modeling situations in which physical flow modeling is prohibitively
time-consuming.
The results in this paper are based on a single test power system that is quite small in
size. Therefore, in the future it may be beneficial to perform similar studies of power systems
with a much larger number of components, such as the IEEE 300 bus system or the Western
Interconnection of the United States. This would aid in validating the general conclusions
drawn in the present paper, but would also provide insight as to how the simulation times
for the different performance measures scale with the size of the system. Furthermore, it
would be of interest to compare power systems of different types (e.g. transmission, sub-
transmission, and distribution) to see how the performance measures described in this paper
behave for these. Finally, this research can be extended to include similar studies for other
types of critical infrastructures, such as water supply systems, telecommunication systems,
and transport systems.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presents a classification for different types of functional models that can be used
for risk and vulnerability analysis of electric power systems. These approaches span from very
simple topologically-oriented models to advanced models based on the engineering and physics
of flows in the system. In order to compare the performance estimates achieved by these
different types of functional models and performance measures, we performed a simulation
study using the IEEE RTS 96 test power system. From our study, we conclude that while some
performance measures may capture the average behavior of the system when perturbed, the
accuracy of the performance estimates for specific scenarios may vary greatly. In other words,
topology-based measures are of limited value in analyzing the robustness of particular power
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systems under specific failure scenarios. Hence, great care should be taken when using these
types of approaches as inputs to decision-making for managing power system vulnerabilities.
On the other hand, simplistic approaches sometimes allow for analysis of a broad spectrum
of scenarios when assessing system vulnerability when such a range of scenarios may be too
difficult to model with more complex methods. Accurate models of infrastructure performance
are critical for infrastructure risk and vulnerability analysis, and further studies are needed to
understand the trade-offs between fidelity and complexity for performance models for other
types of critical infrastructure systems such as water, communication, and transportation
systems.
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Fig. 1. Correlation plots for node removals. Each dot represents the system performance for a given failure scenario as calculated
by a given functional model-performance measure (y-axis) and the AC load flow analysis (x-axis).
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Fig. 2. Correlation plots for edge removals. Each dot represents the system performance for a given failure scenario as calculated
by a given functional model-performance measure (y-axis) and the AC load flow analysis (x-axis).
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Table I . Functional models and performance measures used in analysis.
Functional model Performance measure Label
Topological, undifferentiated components
Largest connected component LCSG
Diameter D
Efficiency E
Topological, differentiated components
Efficiency, pairs of in-feed and load nodes EN
Efficiency, pairs of in-feed and load nodes, weighted by impedance ENE
Connectivity loss CL
Power connection loss PCL
Simplistic capacity Power not supplied PNS
Physical flow
Power not supplied, based on DC power flow DC
Power not supplied, based on AC power flow AC
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Table II . Summary of simple linear regression models developed for each functional model-performance measure pair.
Model Element removed Number removed
a Nodes 1
b Nodes 3
c Nodes 5
d Edges 5
e Edges 7
f Edges 9
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Table III . Summary of functional model-performance measure combinations used in multiple linear regression models.
Combination Covariates
1 LCSG; D; E
2 LCSG; D; EN
3 LCSG; D; EN; CL
4 CL; PCL; PNS
5 LCSG; D; EN; CL; PCL; PNS
6 LCSG; D; EN; CL; PCL; PNS; DC
